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:
ARGUMENT

I.
THE ISSUE CONCERNING SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WAS
ADEQUATELY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
The State initially contends that Hollen's argument on appeal
concerning the insufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated
burglary

charge

was

not

therefore not preserved.
this

end,

the

State

"specifically"

and

is

See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 11-14.

To

asserts

that

the

argued

issue

below

raised

on

appeal

actually presents a legal question regarding whether "a 'taking' of
property necessitates that the actor take physical possession, f" as
opposed to a factual question going to the sufficiency of the
evidence.

S.B.ll.

The State's argument is unfounded.

As an initial matter, Hollen properly argued the issue below
and therefore preserved the issue for appeal.
State points

In its brief, the

to Hollen's choice of words in arguing that his

challenge was too general to be preserved.

S.B.14.

In particular,

the State notes that Hollen, in challenging the aggravated robbery
charge, stated only that it "[l]ack[ed] [] prima facie evidence."
In arguing that Hollen's phraseology is not specific, the
State unduly focuses on semantics and misses the content of the

objection.

Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

(1998)

requires a moving party to make a "timely objection or motion,
stating the specific ground of objection, if
apparent

from

the

context.11

the

objection

was

not

The sole purpose behind Rule 103(a) (1)

is so that "the trial court has the first opportunity to address a
claim that it erred.

If the trial court already has had that

opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver requirements is
weakened considerably."

State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161

(Utah 1991) .
In the present case, Hollen's objection as articulated meets
the requirements of Rule 103(a)(1).

First, the objection was

timely raised immediately after all parties rested and before the
jury went into deliberation during a period specifically reserved
by the trial court for such motions.

R.462[73].

In addition, the motion and its substance as articulated by
Hollen was both clear on its face and apparent from the context of
the argument.

As to facial clarity, Black's Law Dictionary defines

"prima facie" evidence as "[e]vidence good and sufficient on its
face . . . [which], in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the [prosecution's] claim."
1990).

Black's Law Dictionary 1190 (6th ed.

While Hollen's choice of words may not have been common,

(i.e., "the charge fails for insufficient evidence), the meaning of
the phrase he used by definition

clearly communicates the substance

of the challenge - the evidence presented by the state "on its

2

face"

is

not

"sufficient

to

establish

constituting the [prosecution's] claim."

.

.

.

[the]

facts

Id.

Yet, even if Hollen's argument was not facially clear, it was
nonetheless apparent from its context.

The very definition of

"prima facie evidence" notwithstanding, the court made its ruling
on Hollen's challenge after Hollen and counsel for the codefendant
made several other sufficiency challenges to the attempted homicide
charges (counts two and three) and the aggravated kidnaping charges
(counts four through seven).

R.462 [73-84] .

After addressing at

length the challenges to the attempted homicide and aggravated
kidnaping charges, the court addressed the sufficiency challenge
concerning the aggravated robbery charge (count one).

R.462[84-

87].

In this context, it is disingenuous for the State to assert

that

Hollen 1 s

robbery

sufficiency

charge

was

not

challenge
adequately

concerning
specific

the

for

aggravated

purposes

of

preservation.
In

fact,

understood

it

the

is

evident

substance

from

the

record

of the challenge

that

the

to the extent

court
that

addressed the claim on its merits; the court stated, "[t]hat motion
is denied . . . as to count one."
State notes that

R.462[87].

Nonetheless, the

the court invited counsel for the codefendant to

"elaborate" upon the motion, suggesting that the court itself was
not clear on

the substance of the challenge.

S.B.14.

Read in

context, the court's invitation to co-counsel seems to derive not
from a misunderstanding of the motion on the court's part, but from
its abundance of caution in allowing the moving parties (Hollen and
3

the codefendant) to put everything on the record that they felt
necessary.

Consequently, contrary to the State's suggestion, the

mere fact that the trial asked co-counsel if he had " [a] nything
else to add relative to [the sufficiency challenge concerning the
aggravated robbery charge]" does not imply a lack of specificity
for purposes of preservation.

Indeed, the court here had the

"first opportunity" to address the challenge and, therefore, the
"rigid

waiver

requirement"

necessitated here.

called

for

by

the

State

is

not

Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161.

In addition to the foregoing, the State asserts that Hollen
misapprehends the real issue on appeal.

S.B.10.

The State argues

that the real issue is a legal question concerning whether the
"'taking'

of

possession."

property

necessitates

the

actor

take

physical

S.B.ll. The State also suggests that the argument

Hollen should have made is that the information did not provide
adequate notice of the charge against him.

S.B.12.

According to

the State, therefore, Hollen waives his argument on appeal since he
did not make the argument as framed by the State in the trial court
below.

Id.

The State is incorrect.

Contrary to the State's assertion, Hollen's argument is one of
statutory construction which hinges on the facts of the case as
they apply to the aggravated robbery charge as set forth in the
information.

Utah's robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301

(Supp. 1997), provides two distinct provisions
robbery

conviction:

either

thru

the

(1) actual

for securing a
"tak[ing]"

of

property or (2) the "attempt [ed] [] tak[ing]" of property by use of
4

force or fear from another's person or their presence.

In this

case, the State charged aggravated robbery, and likewise instructed
the jury, based only on the theory that Hollen "took" property of
the

Million

instruction).

Dollar

Saloon.

R.10

(information);282-83

(jury

The State neither charged nor instructed the jury on

the "attempt[] to take"

provision.

Id.

Hence, the question becomes, as timely argued by Hollen at
trial, R.462[86-87]; see also supra. and in his opening brief, see
Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 7-11, whether the evidence presented
by the State at trial was sufficient to establish the element of
the

offense

as

charged,

i.e.,

whether

Hollen

"took"

personal

property belonging to the Million Dollar Saloon.1

1

Based on its position that Hollenfs argument should have
been framed in terms of inadequate notice provided in the
information, the State also argues that Hollen's appeal is not
appropriately preserved since he did not present such an issue
"by written pretrial motion." S.B.12 (citing State v. Fulton.
742 P.2d 1208, 1215 (Utah 1987); State v. Pierce. 782 P.2d 194,
195 (Utah App. 1989)).
The State's argument is meritless for several reasons.
First, as discussed above, Hollen's argument was properly and
timely presented as a sufficiency of the evidence challenge.
Moreover, the challenge was made orally at trial in accord with
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b) (1998), which provides that "[a] motion
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in
writing."
In light of the foregoing, the cases relied on by the State
are inapposite here for they concern challenges to the adequacy
of an information, which must be raised "before trial by written
motion." Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1215 (citing Utah R. Crim. P.
12(b)(1), requiring "objections based on defects in the . . .
information" to be raised five days before trial); see also
Pierce, 782 P.2d at 195.
Accordingly, contrary to the State's assertion, Hollen has
not waived his argument on appeal simply because he did not
present a written, pre-trial motion. He was not required to do
so and instead raised an appropriate and timely oral motion
during trial.
5

In sum, Hollen raised his sufficiency challenge in accord with
all

the

dictates

of Rule

103(a)(1),

and

the

trial

court

was

consequently afforded the opportunity to address the challenge.
Moreover, Hollen appropriately framed the argument in terms of
sufficiency

of

the

evidence. Accordingly,

the

State's

waiver

argument is meritless.2
II. THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN FAILING TO
ESTABLISH THAT HOLLEN "TOOK" PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE MILLION
DOLLAR SALOON.
The State never directly responds to Hollen's argument on
appeal, namely the insufficiency of the evidence.

Specifically,

the State does not explain how the evidence establishes that Hollen
"took" property

from the Million Dollar

Saloon when he

never

physically touched the money.
Instead, the State engages in a number of arguments, none of
which were raised by Hollen on appeal, that only peripherally touch
on Hollen's insufficiency challenge.

First, the State asserts that

a "taking" may be proved by evidence of either an attempted or
completed taking, and therefore the State met its burden of proof
where the facts established that Hollen attempted to take the money
from the Million Dollar Saloon while holding the Saloon manager at
gunpoint.

S.B.15-21.

The State's argument does not stand since the prosecutor below
never charged the version of aggravated robbery upon which the

2

The State argues as a final matter regarding preservation
that Hollen did not establish manifest injustice, plain error or
exceptional circumstances. In response, Hollen submits on his
brief discussing plain error. A.B.2-4.
6

State now seeks affirmance.

Rather, the State elected to pursue

one of two distinct theories of robbery, i.e., that Hollen "took
personal property in possession of Million Dollar Saloon."

R.10.

Noticeably absent from the information is the alternative theory of
robbery under Utah law, namely that a person commits robbery if he
"attempts to take" the personal property of another.
Ann.

§§

76-6-301

subsequently

bound

(Supp.
over

1998)
on

and

this

-302

theory

(1995) .
alone

and

Utah Code
Hollen

was

accordingly

prepared his defense for trial.
Hence,

to affirm

the conviction where

the State did not

establish a "taking" based on an alternate theory of robbery not
charged by the State would be a violation of his right of due
process, Utah Const. Art. I, §7

(general due process); United

States Const, amend. XIV (same), and more specifically, a violation
of his right to be apprised of the accusation against him and to
have a copy thereof.

See Utah Const. Art. I, §

12 (securing right

to be informed about charge); Utah Const. Art. I, § 13 ("[o]ffenses
. . . shall be prosecuted by information"); U.S. Const, amend. VI
("accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation"); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah
1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S.Ct. 777, 98 L.Ed.2d 864
(1988)

(notice implicates defendant's rights of due process and

right to be informed of nature of charge).
Moreover, the State cannot now seek to justify the conviction
on appeal by arguing that the

"take" language

that

it

itself

elected to charge contemplates an "attempt to take" as well.
7

As

noted

above,

provisions

Utah's

for

robbery

securing

statute

includes

a conviction, either

establishing a taking or an attempt to take.

two

through

distinct
evidence

The latter provision

was added by the Utah legislature in 1995.

Prior to that, Utah's

robbery

is

statute

read

simply,

" [r]obbery

intentional taking of personal property."

the

unlawful

and

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

301(1) (1995) . Under that statute, the State had to prove a taking
and asportation in order to secure a robbery conviction.

See,

e.g.. State v. Roberts, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974).
In this instance, the State likewise had to prove a taking and
asportation in order to meet its burden of proof for the version of
the aggravated robbery charge asserted against Hollen.

However,

the State failed to do so inasmuch as it never produced evidence
that Hollen had any physical contact with the money
Million

Dollar

Saloon.

A.B.10

(discussing

from the

insufficiency

of

evidence) . Where the State failed both to meet its burden of proof
and to amend the information to include the "attempts to take"
language,

the

evidence.

Id.

conviction

necessarily

fails

for

insufficient

The State alternatively suggests that the conviction should
stand on the basis that Hollen had notice of the "attempts to take"
provision notwithstanding the fact that it was never included in
the information or that he was not bound based on such provision.
S.B.21-24.

Along this same vein, the State also notes that the

jury instructions, "taken as a whole, fully and accurately informed
the

jury

of

the

statutory

elements"
8

of

aggravated

robbery,

including the attempt language.

S.B.25-26.

As an initial matter, Hollen does not argue adequacy of the
information and notice.

Rather, his argument on appeal concerns

the insufficiency of the information in support of the aggravated
robbery

conviction

as

charged

in the

information.

A.B.7-11.

Indeed, Hollen is of the position that he had adequate notice of
the

distinct

theory

of

aggravated

robbery

unsuccessfully sought to prove at trial.

that

the

State

The State's attempt,

therefore, to set up a straw man on appeal and then pull it down is
disingenuous and avoids the real issue at hand.
Nonetheless, even assuming the State's notice argument did
have some bearing on the sufficiency issue, it does not merit
affirmance here.

As noted above, the robbery statute contains two

distinct provisions from which a conviction can be secured, either
through an actual taking or an attempt to take.

The State gave

notice by filing the information that it would proceed on the
theory

that Hollen

Saloon.

R.10

"took" the property

(information).

of the Million

Dollar

Thinking that he understood the

aggravated robbery charge against him, and with no apparent defects
or

gaps

in

the

information,

Hollen

prepared

his

defense

accordingly.
The

question

then

becomes

whether

the

information

"constitutionally adequate" under the circumstances.
Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Utah 1991).

was

See State v.

"The right to adequate

notice in the Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to state
the charge with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant
9

from multiple prosecutions for the same crime and to give notice
sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense."

Id.

In the

present case, the aggravated robbery conviction cannot be affirmed
upon an attempt theory because the State did not "charge
theory of the case] with sufficient specificity."

[that

Id.; see supra

(noting that attempt theory of robbery is distinct from an actual
taking

theory).

Therefore,

Hollen

opportunity to defend himself.

did

not

have

an

adequate

Id.

In this manner, the present case is distinguishable from State
v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 446 (Utah App. 1996), wherein this court
affirmed an incest conviction, in part, on the basis that it was
properly charged in the information.

In that case, the State did

not include certain portions of the statutory language defining
incest.

Id.

Nonetheless, this Court held that all "the elements

of the offense" were properly alleged since the omitted statutory
language did not "constitute a discrete element of the crime of
incest."

Id.

In the case at bar, by contrast, the

"attempts to take"

language omitted from the information did constitute a "discrete
element" of aggravated robbery.

Id.

Hence, all the elements of

the aggravated robbery charge upon which the State seeks affirmance
were not included in the information.

Therefore, to affirm the

conviction on that basis would amount to a violation of Hollen's
rights under the Utah and federal constitutions.

See Utah Const.

Art. I, § 7 (general due process); Art. I, § 12 ("the accused shall
have

the

right

. . .

to demand
10

the nature

and cause of

the

accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof"); Utah Const.
Art. I, 13 ("[o]ffenses shall be prosecuted by information"); U.S.
Const, amend. VI (securing right to be informed of the nature and
cause of charge).
That the jury was instructed as to the alternate "attempts to
take" robbery theory does not cure the constitutional problems with
affirmance in this case.

S.B.25-26.

Again, Hollen was informed as

to one theory of the aggravated robbery charge, bound over on that
charge, and presented his defense accordingly.

Informing the jury

at the end of Hollen1s trial as to the alternate attempt theory
does not fulfill the constitutional notice requirements because
Hollen had already prepared and presented his defense.

Hence, the

State's argument concerning the jury instructions is unavailing.
As a final matter, the State asserts that the conviction
should be affirmed on the basis of invited error.
Again, the State's argument is without merit.

S.B.26-27.

The doctrine of

invited error applies only when a party intentionally misleads a
court into error then complains of it on appeal.

See State v.

Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
Contrary to the State's unfounded allegation in its brief,
Hollen

did not intentionally mislead

the court

into error by

consciously omitting to raise the court's attention to the absence
of the "attempts to take" language in the information.

S.B.27.

As

noted above, Hollen proceeded to defend his case based on the
theory

of the aggravated

information.

robbery

charge

as set forth

in the

He argued before the court and to the jury that the
11

State failed to show that he "took" property belonging to the
Million

Dollar

Saloon.

R.462[86-87,132] .

Such

above-board

dealings with the court can hardly be classified as a strategic and
manipulative intent on Hollen's part to "preserve a hidden ground
for reversal on appeal."

Dunn, 850 P. 2d at 1220; cf. , State v.

Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (" [d]efendants are [] not
entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the
benefit of objecting on appeal;" defendant strategically raised
only

a

few

admissibility

evidentiary

objections

of almost

all evidence

at

trial

but

on appeal).

challenged
Hence, the

State's claim of invited error is unfounded and does not preclude
reversal in this case.
In light of the foregoing and the argument

set

forth in

Hollen's opening brief, the aggravated robbery conviction is not
supported by the evidence presented by the State at trial.
CONCLUSION
Hollen respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient evidence.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument.
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